Government, non-government and community organisations in

disasters by King, David

18
2
Government, non-government and 
community organisations in 
disasters
David King 
In the event of a disaster, communities become the targets of specialist 
organizations and undergo a concentration of activities. The complex 
unstructured activities and routines of daily life are disrupted and even 
totally overwhelmed by a single catastrophic event that requires a redirection 
of priorities, resources and people, to deal with all aspects of the disaster 
impact as rapidly as possible. The whole community must be mobilised to 
restore functions and meet needs, to return to the normality of the pre-
disaster state. This latter purpose is least likely to be achieved, as the 
destroyed community can seldom rebuild to the same complex, but 
randomly haphazard state that existed before the disaster.  
To mobilise the whole community to a single purpose of recovery, requires a 
high level of organisation. Response to a disaster demands that there be 
purposeful organisations ready to provide leadership and action. Emergency 
Management is predicated on the existence of such purposeful organisations. 
However, while organisations are at the core of Emergency Management 
Response and Recovery they are by no means simple or singular. Disaster 
generates the activities of a plethora of organisations, which interact with the 
community, rather than simply organising disaster response. The 
community also organises itself, re-assigning priorities and using existing 
organisations and networks. 
The Emergency Management Organisational Environment 
This chapter examines the range and roles of organisations that are involved 
in all aspects of disaster. The organisations are the structure of disaster 
Preparedness, Prevention, Response and Recovery, but the community and 
its citizens are the core of the effects of the disaster itself. In recognition of 
this Emergency Management has shifted its roles from a concentration on 
the traditional phases of Preparedness, Prevention, Response and Recovery 
to a much more community centred approach (Cronstedt, 2002). However, 
professional emergency managers, who have the greatest knowledge of such 
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shifts in approaches and the reasons behind them, are only employed in 
some of the organisations that are involved in disasters. While the 
professional emergency managers may provide the most direct leadership 
and integrative structure to the tasks of dealing with disaster (Britton, 2001), 
the numerous other organisations that become involved have formerly 
existed to provide other kinds of services and functions which must be 
subsumed to deal with the immediate needs of a disaster. Thus although 
professional emergency managers in mainstream hazard oriented 
organisations may be aware of the complexity of the management and 
leadership roles that they are practising, this does not necessarily transfer to 
the managers and leaders of other organisations.  
The traditional Emergency Management structure of Preparedness, 
Prevention, Response and Recovery (or its variant acronyms) is presented in 
Figure 2.1 below. These four processes structure the tasks of planning for 
likely disaster scenarios and for responding, and then reconstructing society 
and community in the event of a disaster occurring.  
Figure 2.1 Integrated Emergency Management System (source: EMD, 2000) 
Increasingly Emergency Management is using the term Mitigation as a larger 
group of activities that subsume both Preparedness and Prevention. The US 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) uses preparedness and 
mitigation as separate stages. Emergency Management Australia (EMA) 
defines mitigation as “measures taken in advance of a disaster aimed at 
decreasing or eliminating its impact on society and the environment. See 
also prevention.” (EMA, 1998, p. 76).  
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Preparedness is defined as “arrangements to ensure that, should an 
emergency occur, all those resources and services which are needed to cope 
with the effects can be efficiently mobilised and deployed. Measures to 
ensure that, should an emergency occur, communications, resources and 
services are capable of coping with the effects” (EMA, 1998, p. 88). As a 
disaster is an event that is “beyond the day to day capacity of the prescribed 
statutory authorities and which requires special mobilising and organising of 
resources other than those normally available to these authorities” (EMA, 
1998, pp. 32-33) the implication is that preparation is entirely contingent 
upon the scale of the disaster, which is presumably affected by preventive 
measures that have been put in place. The activities cannot exist separately. 
Preparing for a disaster will most likely initiate the process, but from then 
onwards both sets of activities are inextricably linked, reinforcing and 
complementary. As Emergency Management stakeholders have been using 
mitigation as an inclusive concept that subsumes preparedness and 
prevention, it has been used in that sense in Figure 2.1 above, partly in order 
to simplify a diagram that attempts to express the complexity of the stages of 
Emergency Management. However, it is irresponsible for any agency to 
prepare for a disaster without instigating preventive measures, even if these 
are as basic as information and warnings.  The Emergency Management 
structure partially defines organisational roles and responsibilities, but has 
tended to portray them as steps or as a linear process, as in Figure 2.1.  Many 
commentators (Cronstedt, 2002; Britton, 2001; Yates, 1999; Comfort et al., 
2001) have criticised this linear model of Preparedness, Prevention, 
Response and Recovery. 
These weaknesses and criticisms of the traditional model have led the author 
to develop a three-dimensional model as presented in Figure 2.2 below. 
If the Emergency Management system is simplified into three main groups 
of activities: Mitigation; Response; and Recovery, there are distinct 
identifiable roles and responsibilities. Organisations fit into these three 
broad areas, but not as exclusive processes. Many organisations, both 
government and non-government, are involved in multiple aspects of 
disaster mitigation, response and recovery. All these elements are ongoing 
and interlinked and Figure 2.2 illustrates how these processes may operate 
simultaneously, interlinking and reinforcing. Mitigation is practised by all 
organisations and communities to varying degrees, even subconsciously or 
by seasonal routine. Mitigation of disaster impact is not a process that stops 
when hazard impact turns into a disaster. The disaster impact is part of the 
mitigation process in testing, challenging and confronting both the 
organisations and citizens. A process of learning and direct experience feeds 
back into mitigation, which grows in potential from the actual experience of 
the disaster.
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Figure 2.2 Mitigation, Response and Recovery in space and time 
Thus mitigation is shown as an iterative and encompassing process. It 
proceeds through feedback loops, identifying and responding to 
shortcomings and needs. It can also appear to revert, or go backwards, as 
obstacles are confronted and mitigation measures fail or are too costly or 
difficult to implement. Mitigation can be made even more difficult through 
the contradictory efforts of different agencies. For example, road safety 
oriented street designs are concerned with traffic calming and a hierarchy of 
types of streets that reduce and slow local traffic. In flood or storm surge 
evacuation these design elements can create bottlenecks and congestion and 
may actually endanger lives. Levees provide short term protection, but in the 
long term may result in far more serious and widespread flooding.  In other 
locations, flood drainage channels may also exacerbate flooding. The design 
of roads to act as drainage channels reduces their effectiveness in the event 
of evacuation.  
Response has been typically the Emergency Management focus for a hazard 
impact or disaster. The reality of a disaster overwhelming the emergency 
services limits their initial response. The first response is from the impacted 
community. People who experience the direct effects of a disaster are not 
passive victims. They are active participants who will work through a range 
of organisations and networks to deal with the crisis. People may be 
traumatised, injured and suffering loss, but despite this they are the first 
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people on the scene, the first to respond and the first to begin the recovery 
process. Recovery begins the moment a disaster happens (Sullivan, 2003).  
The event also triggers a response in those organisations that have a 
responsibility or a role in the disaster. Preparation for a predictable and 
probable hazard is beyond being just mitigation, it is part of the response. 
Decisions have been made before the event that determine who will do what 
when the event happens. As citizens take shelter and carry out final 
precautions and preparations, the emergency organisations also position 
themselves to deal with the impact. Post-disaster studies in northern 
Australia (King, 2002) have shown that people leave a significant amount of 
preparation until the last minute, when the impact of the hazard is certain 
(or at least the probability is very high). All of the post disaster studies 
undertaken by the author in northern Australia have been floods and tropical 
cyclones, or both, which can be predicted to such an extent that people can 
feel confident in carrying out late preparations. The media refers to panic 
buying and last minute panic preparations, but observations of people and 
communities have not portrayed panic. In the immediate few hours before 
impact people are calm and purposeful in their behaviour, although most 
will express emotions that principally include concern, excitement and some 
degree of nervousness. In the tropical north of Australia people are advised 
to clear up potential debris at the beginning of the cyclone season, and to 
prepare an emergency kit. The fact that they delay this preparation until a 
cyclone or flood is inevitable, is a behavioural response that is mirrored by 
most organisations. Mental preparation and planning notes what needs to be 
done, but scarce resources cannot be allocated to the hazard response until it 
happens. Thus actions which are expected as preparations, are in reality 
postponed to become part of the response; a pre-disaster response. The 
response is therefore a direct outcome of mitigations and begins immediately 
before the hazard hits. The completely unexpected and extreme disaster has 
probably not been prepared for or mitigated against. Response and Recovery 
in such an event will begin immediately after it has happened.  
Recovery is triggered by the response. It begins immediately after the 
disaster has occurred, but it is not a linear process (Sullivan, 2003; 
Cronstedt, 2002). The response to the disaster involves many different 
organisations, government and non government, each of which has separate 
roles, responsibilities and agendas. They carry out different tasks, at separate 
times and places, as well as overlapping and even sometimes competing with 
one another. In the ideal world all of these organisations would be 
coordinated by a single authority. In the developing world especially, this is 
frequently not the case.  
A coordinating authority may exist, but it is frequently under-funded, poorly 
resourced, and even ignored by non-government organisations (NGOs), 
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other government departments and politicians. This happened on a large 
scale in Papua New Guinea (PNG) following the Sissano Lagoon Tsunami 
disaster in 1998. To a lesser degree, coordination of the response to the 
impact of Cyclone Zoe on Tikopia and Anuta in the Solomon Islands in 2003 
was constrained by a collapse of governance in that country, with the 
consequent inability of coordinating authorities to initiate a rapid response 
without outside assistance. Thus response is contingent upon the wealth of a 
nation, not just in terms of its physical capability, but more importantly in 
terms of governance.  
The response phase can easily be poorly coordinated or chaotic. Even in the 
best of circumstances, the devastating impact of a disaster means that 
responses will come in pulses of activities that will inevitably occur 
separately in time and space. As response cannot be equal, recovery is most 
certainly not equal or linear. Recovery is also community initiated as well as 
developing from the organisational response. Community and organisational 
Response and Recovery efforts may proceed in parallel, virtually 
independent of one another. Again, this process of parallel recovery is far 
more likely to occur in developing countries, where a lack of pre-disaster 
infrastructure exacerbates problems of Response and Recovery.  
Recovery proceeds in unequal pulses that involve a series of feedback loops 
as well as setbacks and secondary crises, such as public health emergencies 
that emanate from the initial disaster and redirect resources and efforts, 
thereby slowing the recovery process, and adding fresh impacts and trauma 
to the afflicted community. Recovery is an iterative process that develops 
opportunities as well encountering constraints.  
The Organisations 
It is within these complex interlinking phases of Emergency Management 
that organisations operate. Primary Emergency Management is generally 
practised by governments, with citizens reasonably expecting that emergency 
organisations will come to their aid in a disaster. Their expectations include 
a response from the army or defence force. The reality of a disaster is that the 
local emergency services and the civil functions of local government 
organisations are unable to cope, and the army does not necessarily have an 
Emergency Management role. Some countries use their defence forces to a 
greater extent than Australia, with civil defence having a much stronger 
relationship to military defence. Until 2001 Australia’s peak Emergency 
Management body, EMA, came under the Department of Defence, although 
it was not answerable to the military, nor they to EMA, although EMA is a 
civil defence organisation in the event of war. However, it remains a 
misconception of many citizens that the defence forces will automatically be 
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involved in a major disaster. On many occasions they have been involved, 
especially in such massive disasters as Cyclone Tracy in 1974 and 1975, but 
they only participate on request from civil authorities. This also applies to 
overseas relief operations, where the decision to use the defence forces is 
made by central government.  
Emergency Management is therefore primarily a civil government activity, 
coordinated from the local level through state or provincial governments, up 
to a central government response depending upon the severity of the disaster 
(Douglas, 1999; Norman & Coles, 2003). In developing nations a lack of 
resources, as well as traditions of military involvement in government, may 
result in a stronger reliance on military intervention in disasters. There are 
many developing nations that have a small or even no defence force, 
especially in the Pacific where only PNG and Fiji have armies. Although PNG 
has experienced a long civil war on Bougainville, its colonial and 
development experience put strong emphasis on its police and civil 
authorities, such that it’s defence force continues to take a secondary role in 
disaster response.  
Emergency Management is structured through laws that apportion 
responsibility for preparedness and prevention, and for response and 
recovery. For example in Queensland the Disaster Management Act 2003
(Queensland Government, 2003) specifies arrangements that are primarily 
carried out at the level of the local government. Local governments vary 
enormously in size and area. The smallest local government areas in 
northern Australia have less than 1,000 people and many have land areas in 
excess of 50,000 square kilometres. Their organisational capacity to deal 
with disaster is very limited, although the remotest parts of the north cope 
with floods and cyclones that in more developed parts of Australia would 
constitute a natural hazard or become a disaster. A similar resilience 
supports communities in remote parts of developing nations in South-East 
Asia and the Pacific.  
Although legislation puts responsibility on local levels of government to 
prepare for disaster, the capability to respond adequately is limited. Apart 
from local government, disaster preparation is a requirement for all other 
government departments that provide social and welfare services to the 
community. In a disaster these needs are increased and are more urgent. 
Emergency Management coordinates the responses of all these government 
organisations, but they are separate entities answerable to different political 
masters. Each government department has its own priorities, agendas and 
needs, even within an atmosphere of cooperation. While many of these 
organisations have clearly defined, exclusive roles, such as health and police, 
organisations responsible for specific community members, such as the aged, 
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or specific ethnic groups, may end up side by side providing very similar 
services.  
Government is only one of many types of organisations that become involved 
in disasters. The trend in government has been towards less government and 
more privatisation. Former government roles in welfare and service 
provision are now provided by private enterprise. There is a blurred line 
between companies that are providing services to the public, and the 
traditional NGOs that began life as charities. At the further end of the 
business end of this continuum of organisations are companies that are in 
business to make profits for their shareholders, but which possess plant, 
machinery and expertise or infrastructure to play a very significant role in 
community recovery. Some companies are devastated or go out of business 
in a disaster, but for many others it is an opportunity for expansion, and 
inevitably profit, although individuals working for these companies may be 
no less motivated by altruism than members of government and relief 
organisations. The need to operate profitably does not in any way lessen 
their commitment to any of the phases of Emergency Management. At the 
same time they may even be able to provide services more efficiently and at a 
lower cost. That is often the aim of privatisation.  
At the other end of this continuum are charities and humanitarian NGOs 
whose members are driven principally by beliefs, altruism and often a strong 
political agenda. However, the humanitarian NGOs have been undergoing 
quite dramatic changes to their roles. These issues and their impact on 
Emergency Management, especially in developing countries will be returned 
to later in this chapter. 
On one scale there exists this continuum between altruistic NGOs at one end 
and purely commercial business operations at the other end. Stretching this 
scale is a size and spatial continuum that ranges from the international and 
national government organisations down to community, household and 
residual leadership. These ideas are expressed in Figure 2.3 in terms of these 
continua.
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Figure 2.3 Organisation and membership of organisations 
Table 2.1 below lists the types of organisations involved in Emergency 
Management and disaster response and recovery. The model expressed in 
both Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and listed in Table 2.1, is organisations coming 
together from diverse backgrounds to focus on a disaster event, within the 
dimensions of space, time and specialist roles and skills. 
Table 2.1 Organisations involved in Emergency Management 
Direct Indirect Residual & 
Spontaneous 
International Businesses Culture 
Government
Organisations 
Economic
Organisations 
Community Networks 
Non-government 
Organisations 
Recreational 
Organisations 
Internet 
Privatised Specialists Religious 
Organisations 
Residual Leadership 
Grass Roots 
Organisations 
Cultural Groups Volunteers 
Community 
Organisations 
Interest Groups Fixers & Tradespersons 
Political Groups Illegal Groups 
 Media Family & Household 
  Individuals & Visitors
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The organisations directly involved are those that have a primary 
responsibility for Emergency Management and disaster mitigation. 
Government organisations include all levels of government as outlined 
earlier. The NGOs include the traditional relief organisations and charities, 
but there are also NGOs that would be included in the indirectly involved 
group of organisations, such as Landcare, the formal organisations of 
religions, various types of youth groups that provide volunteers and so on. 
These are separate from organisations like the State Emergency Services 
(SES), which rely on volunteers, but are sponsored directly by government. 
However, many groups, including rural fire brigades, surf lifesaving clubs 
and others, are essentially community organisations. Grass Roots 
Organisations (GROs) are very definitely local community groups. Within 
the developing world, many GROs were formed as progress associations for 
the sake of advancing development, but adapted to relief and recovery in the 
event of a disaster. In the developed world GROs have often been single 
issue, but otherwise quite loose organisations. Some of these have responded 
directly to disasters or the threat of a hazard, as victim support or lobby 
groups, but there are far more GROs that are indirectly involved in disaster 
Response and Recovery (Fahey, 2003). They may not have been formed with 
any thought of hazard or disaster, but once formed they create and maintain 
community links and networks which may be rapidly used in a crisis.  
The indirect group of organisations are those which exist primarily for a 
purpose other than hazard mitigation, but which contribute resources, 
personnel, networks and knowledge during and after a disaster. Included 
here are the media, in all of its forms and roles. The media are primarily a 
private enterprise industry, but it is crucial to government organisations and 
emergency managers who depend upon media response to get information, 
warnings and messages to the community. The media are often the earliest 
responders to a disaster, providing initial information and immediate 
impressions. When category five Cyclone Zoe hit the island of Tikopia, a 
remote and extremely isolated outlier of the Solomon Islands the first 
outsider to provide any news of the islanders’ survival was a freelance 
journalist who chartered a helicopter from New Zealand. It is interesting that 
the journalist’s initial report of devastation and survival described people 
fishing. Thus although the media comprised the first outsider, the Tikopians 
had got on with their own process of survival and recovery.  
The media are also extremely powerful in advertising a crisis and prompting 
political and citizen response. The corollary of this power is the invisibility of 
unreported, or poorly reported disasters. Disasters are, in part, constructed 
by the media. They often exaggerate human interest elements, they look for 
scandals and government ineptitude, assign blame and instigate generous 
28
relief responses. They self censor some images of suffering, but are also 
guilty of misusing distressing images to increase the impact of their stories. 
Emergency managers have no control over the media and need their positive 
support at all phases of Emergency Management. All organisations must 
therefore devote some of their resources to media liaison and must 
continually work at these networks. NGOs especially, work hard at 
developing their media image and ensuring media visibility as citizen 
generosity is a key component of their income.  
There also exists a level of informal organisation that can be grouped under 
residual and spontaneous organisations. These are two quite separate 
community processes. The spontaneous response and resulting organisation, 
or community, or network, occurs directly as a consequence of the disaster 
event. The ‘residual organisations’ are those elements of civil society that 
underpin all that people do, the ways in which society is defined and 
constructed, the traditional, and the informal. Residual organisations are 
culturally constructed, grounded in community and civil society, 
representative of the ways people organise and network. This is not 
necessarily something ancient and ‘culturally known’, although it certainly 
includes that part of society, but it also includes all that is immediate and 
functional.
Figure 2.4 A matrix of types of organisations 
The size and numbers of organisations that participate in any disaster vary 
with the spatial extent, the severity and the population that is involved.  
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Obviously, the more organisations that are involved, the more complex is the 
task of Emergency Management. These organisations bring to the 
community a wide range of skills and approaches. These variations are 
illustrated in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.  
Figure 2.3 expresses a range in size, organisational structure and scale. No 
organisation can encompass all of these types, they will sit primarily in one 
or more sectors. Figure 2.4 illustrates the variety of structures within 
organisations and the community. The upper left area is structured, the 
lower right is unstructured. Urban society, in particular, is a highly complex, 
unstructured matrix of networks and linkages. It is like the structure of the 
Internet, allowing enormous numbers of groupings and largely informal 
organisations (Alexander, 1966). This is the community which is managed by 
formal Emergency Management with its clear cut organisational hierarchy. 
Cutting across this continuum is a range of organisations from the formally 
structured NGOs which may include businesses and companies, through to 
the spontaneous and residual. Where the community initiates and pursues 
its own Response and Recovery, it is in the lower right area of the model, 
unstructured but not necessarily disorganised. 
Thus it is inevitable in any disaster that problems of organisation and 
leadership will emerge. The effectiveness with which these issues are 
resolved will have a powerful influence on the effectiveness of Response and 
Recovery. Organisations will pursue their own agendas generating both 
contradiction and complementarity. Communities will pursue their own, 
often parallel, routes to Response, Recovery and Mitigation (Spillan, 2003; 
Palmer, 2001; Benini, 1999; Juratowitch et al., 2003; Silberbauer, 2003; 
Prater & Wu, 2002; Loosemore & Hughes, 2001).  
NGO Roles in Complex Emergencies 
The roles of NGOs in complex emergencies have been distorted away from 
needy communities towards the demands of governments and international 
agencies. Understanding the shift in the roles of NGOs raises issues that may 
help countries that have experienced a complex disaster, to better coordinate 
the naturally occurring processes of community recovery and redevelopment 
within a NGO policy. However, the problems and issues faced by the NGOs 
themselves are also complex. 
Most NGOs involved in development have evolved from a humanitarian 
liberal and idealistic agenda, but performance in development has been 
ineffective or patchy, both sectorally and geographically (Edwards & Hulme, 
2002). With local knowledge and local institutional organisation, 
development NGOs found themselves well placed to intervene in relief when 
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states collapsed and conflict emerged (Keen, 1998; Harvey, 1998; Edwards & 
Hulme, 2001). Being reliant on donors for funding many NGOs found 
themselves beneficiaries of increased publicity as wars and associated 
natural disasters developed. It was easy to shift from development to relief 
when the budget expanded, although obviously to professionals committed 
to improvement in the quality of life in developing societies, there was no 
choice but to become involved in relief.  
The accountability of NGOs is both to the donor and to the recipient, upward 
and downward. The end of the Cold War took many governments, such as 
the USA and USSR, out of direct aid competition in the developing world. 
Aid was both relatively reduced and channelled through international 
agencies and NGOs (Fowler, 2001; Reno, 1997). NGOs became more 
connected with donors who were bigger and more powerful (Edwards & 
Hulme, 2001). Even though developing nation governments may have lost 
the ability to govern their own countries they have still been able to exert an 
influence on NGOs. This is acceptable and even necessary where 
coordination is needed, but it has added another level of accountability 
upward, to the detriment of downward accountability (Edwards & Fowler, 
2001; Keen, 1998; Edwards & Hulme a & b, 2001; Hilhorst, 2002). Thus 
NGOs are in greater danger of disengaging from direct partnership with 
disaster affected communities, while they serve instead the needs and 
agendas of host governments, private donors, donor agencies and Western 
donor governments. 
The concept of political aid and a hierarchy of victims (Fox, 2001) challenge 
the political naivety of NGO relief efforts that indirectly (or directly through 
corruption and theft) support combatants and extend or exacerbate the 
conflict (Fox, 2001; Duffield, 2001; Macrae & Leader, 2001; Keen, 1998). 
Thus on one side NGOs have been criticised for supporting corrupt 
governments by providing outside funded welfare projects, while on another 
side they undermine those same governments by enabling combatants to 
stay in business (Woodward, 2001), on yet another side they play into the 
globalisation agenda by practising privatisation of social services and 
international aid (Cliffe, 2000; Fowler, 2001; Edwards & Hulme, 2001) and 
on the fourth side they have neglected accountability to, and partnership 
with, the community they exist to serve. 
Against this background, the development NGOs have been drawn into 
increasingly complex conflicts, involving many players, unclear goals, 
struggles for resources and in some cases associated natural disasters; and 
all of the outcomes of displacement, medical crises; collapse of government 
and destruction of infrastructure. These ‘new wars’ of the new millennium or 
the twenty-first century, challenge all relief agencies to participate in the 
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peace process as actively as the military organisations that are involved. 
Most of the ‘new wars’ have taken place in Africa, and they are symptomatic 
of a collapse of governance and development. Within the Asia Pacific region 
the East Timor conflict was the last of the ‘old wars’, a post-colonial struggle 
for independence, where there were clear goals on both sides. The collapse of 
governance in the Solomon Islands during 2002 and 2003 was more typical 
of the new conflicts and the complex humanitarian response. PNG faces the 
danger of similar disruption, while in Indonesia and the Philippines complex 
ethnic/political conflicts share many similarities with those of Africa. Of 
particular significance is the connection between economic setbacks and a 
slowing of development with the emergence of regional, ethnic and religious 
conflicts.
Firstly, the ‘new wars’ involve a dislocation of globalisation and network 
connections, especially in relation to the trade in cheap arms and the 
migrations of refugees (Cliffe, 2000). Secondly, these wars create their own 
political economies. The commonly used term ‘warlord economies’ (Reno, 
1997), describes conflicts as a competition for resources that had formerly 
been controlled by the patronage system that had developed out of 
colonialism.  Thirdly, the public and private spheres are blurred as 
combatants change sides, and mercenaries and criminals become involved. 
Fourthly, there are no significant political goals in these new wars. The ‘new 
wars’ are cheap wars (Keen, 1998; Richards, 1996) where terrorism or 
dominance of the unarmed civilian population is easily achieved, but the 
capacity to defeat a government is insufficient. The under-funded hand to 
mouth campaigns of such rebels contributes to their lack of goals.  
As international agencies and NGOs move into a humanitarian disaster, 
alongside or parallel to community activity, the involvement of central 
government may facilitate or direct redevelopment within a broader political 
framework and development strategy. A strong civil society that works with 
NGOs may improve the developmental aspects of relief (Harvey, 1998). Civil 
society as a concept includes all the positive aspects of community, 
independent of the state and thereby the grassroots that presents a bottom 
up approach to development. Civil society is not totally undermined by 
disaster, but in the face of war or disaster it transforms and re-emerges. It is 
a rehabilitation model that is downwardly accountable and separate from 
state and donor politics. Its mechanism for reconstruction is to utilise 
community or traditional institutions and structures. 
Conclusion
Organisations exist to respond to disasters and to reconstruct places and 
communities, but the circumstances of each disaster throw up unique 
problems and sets of complex issues that will stress and constrain even the 
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most experienced disaster organisations.  Disasters overwhelm.  Most 
governments and government agencies, especially at the local area level that 
experiences the disaster impact, will have had little previous direct 
experience of dealing with an actual disaster.  Organisations exist primarily 
to meet other needs and provide regular and routine services.  In developed 
industrialised countries, governments and non-government organisations 
are overwhelmed by disaster, but when governance is much weaker, 
especially in the poorer countries of the world, formal organisations are even 
less likely to be able to respond or even to function at all.  Added to weak 
governance, are issues of cultural pluralism, social and economic divisions, 
control of the state territory, and thus even the willingness, let alone 
capacity, of governments to provide aid or assistance to specific groups or 
locations. 
Conventional models of Emergency Management presuppose that 
government and non-government organisations will proceed through regular 
processes to respond, aid recovery, and mitigate against future hazards.  The 
reality is that capacity is far more constrained than Emergency Management 
processes portend.  Also underplayed in formal organisational models is the 
role of virtually everyone else in responding to and recovering from a 
disaster.  Community, business, non-formal organisations and individuals 
take actions to respond to hazards and recover from disaster without 
necessarily relating to the roles of formal organisations.  Organising the 
organisational and non-organisational response is part of the process and 
chaos of any disaster.  It is possible to identify all the levels and types of 
organisations and communities that have been examined in this chapter, but 
what each would do in the unique disaster event remains as unpredictable as 
the disaster impact itself.  What is essential is the recognition by Emergency 
Management that it will always deal with the consequences of a disaster in 
partnership with a plethora of government, business and community 
organisations each of which has its own priorities, structures and 
procedures. 
A modified version of this chapter was first published as Organisations in disaster,  
Natural Hazards, 40(3), 657-665 in March 2007. 
